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A BALANCING ACT FOR AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES:
ANTIHARASSMENT POLICY V. FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Bridget Hart*
Legal scholars, educational administrators, journalists, and
students have all witnessed a rise in students being disciplined by
university officials for speech and conduct deemed inappropriate for
college campuses. In endeavoring to explain this trend, some
academics point to the disconnect between the Department of
Education and university administrators regarding the legal
standards for campus antiharassment policies. The lack of clarity
regarding what constitutes harassment on college campuses has
resulted in the punishment of students by universities for speech and
conduct that is normally considered to be protected speech under
the First Amendment. This Note first provides an overview of the
First Amendment and its application to students. It then examines
why colleges and universities are perplexed about the standards that
should guide their antiharassment policies. Lastly, this Note
introduces a solution to the confusion, one that includes a well-
supported, formal standard for evaluating peer-on-peer
harassment, but also incorporates existing First Amendment
jurisprudence. This solution would hopefully allow universities to
better balance the equally important interests of protecting students
from legitimate harassment and fostering free speech and free
expression on college campuses.
INTRODUCTION
The state of free speech and expression, and the potential decline
in the protection of such speech due to an emphasis on political
correctness, on college campuses has dominated headlines for the
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past few years.1 President Barack Obama, during a town hall
meeting in Des Moines, Iowa in September 2015, became yet
another commentator on the matter of free speech on our nation’s
university campuses.2 President Obama adamantly asserted that:
The purpose of college is not just to transmit skills.
It’s also to widen your horizons; to make you a better
citizen; to help you to evaluate information, to help
you make your way through the world; to help you
be more creative . . . I don’t agree that you—when
you become students at colleges—have to be coddled
and protected from different points of view.3
Discussion and debate centered on free speech in higher
education have engaged educators, lawmakers, scholars, and
* J.D. Candidate Brooklyn Law School, 2017; B.A. in Political Science, Villanova
University, 2014. Thank you to my family and friends, most notably my parents,
Nancy and David Hart, for their endless support and encouragement. Thank you
to the Journal of Law and Policy executive board and staff for their thoughtful
editing and insight.
1 See, e.g., Jonathan Chait, Not a Very P.C. Thing to Say: How the Language
Police are Perverting Liberalism, N.Y. MAG. (Jan. 27, 2015),
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/01/not-a-very-pc-thing-to-say.html
(discussing the return of political correctness to college campuses and the
“challenge of balancing freedom of expression against other values such as
societal cohesion and tolerance”); David Schaper, University of Chicago Tells
Freshmen It Does Not Support ‘Trigger Warnings’, NPR (Aug. 26, 2016),
http://www.npr.org/2016/08/26/491531869/university-of-chicago-tells-
freshmen-it-does-not-support-trigger-warnings (discussing a letter sent by the
University of Chicago to its new students explaining that the school does not
support “trigger warnings” due to its commitment to free speech and expression);
Judith Shulevitz, Opinion, In College and Hiding From Scary Ideas, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 21, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/22/opinion/sunday/judith-
shulevitz-hiding-from-scary-ideas.html?_r=0 (discussing safe spaces on college
campuses and how “the notion that ticklish conversations must be scrubbed clean
of controversy has a way of leaking out and spreading”).
2 President Obama: College Students Shouldn’t Be ‘Coddled and Protected
From Different Points of View’, FIRE (Sept. 15, 2015),
https://www.thefire.org/president-obama-college-students-shouldnt-be-coddled-
and-protected-from-different-points-of-view/.
3 Barack Obama, Opinion, President Obama Stands Up for Free Speech on
Campus, N.Y. POST (Sept. 15, 2015, 7:09 PM),
http://nypost.com/2015/09/15/president-obama-stands-up-for-free-speech-on-
campus/.
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Supreme Court justices for decades.4 Recently, however, the
conversation has taken up a particularly pervasive nature, as it
appears that “something strange is happening at America’s colleges
and universities.”5
In the September 2015 issue of The Atlantic, the cover story,
titled “The Coddling of the American Mind,” explored what the
authors of the piece claim is “a movement . . . undirected and driven
largely by students, to scrub campuses clean of words, ideas, and
subjects that might cause discomfort or give offense.”6 This
movement is being characterized as a kind of “resurgence of
political correctness,”7 which has manifested itself in the form of
“trigger warnings” by professors in the classroom,8 student
disapproval and action against “microaggressions,”9 and a general
intolerance of offensive speech and conduct by university
administrations.10 While a great deal of the speech targeted by this
movement may indeed be generally offensive, distasteful, and
4 See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (discussing the issue where
a university president denied a student group recognition due to the organization’s
philosophy being antithetical to the university’s policies); Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (discussing the issue where students
were suspended for wearing black armbands in school to publicize their objections
to the hostilities in Vietnam); Eugene Volokh, How Harassment Law Restricts
Free Speech, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 563 (1995) (discussing free speech and
workplace harassment law) [hereinafter Volokh, Harassment Law]; U.S. Dep’t of
Educ., Office for Civil Rights, First Amendment: Dear Colleague Letter (July 28,
2003), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/firstamend.html (requiring, by a
letter written by the Office for Civil rights, distancing of the department from
decisions made by private institutions that limit free speech) [hereinafter Dear
Colleague Letter].
5 Greg Lukianoff & Jonathan Haidt, The Coddling of the American Mind,
ATLANTIC (Sept. 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/09/the-
coddling-of-the-american-mind/399356/.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Lukianoff and Haidt, in The Coddling of the American Mind, define
“trigger warnings” as “alerts that professors are expected to issue if something in
a course might cause a strong emotional response.” Id.
9 ”Microaggressions” can be defined as “small actions or word choices that
seem on their face to have no malicious intent but that are thought of as a kind of
violence nonetheless.” Id.
10 Id.
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repugnant, the movement has also given way to concerns voiced by
free speech advocates, who find that because of this “new climate
that is slowly becoming institutionalized,” students are being
punished by their colleges and universities for speech and conduct
that is protected by the First Amendment.11
During the summer of 2015, a Texas Christian University
student was disciplined by the college administration with a
“suspension in abeyance” and “disciplinary probation” until the
student’s graduation, following a series of racist tweets found on the
student’s Twitter page.12 One tweet at issue read “#Baltimore in 4
words: poor uneducated druggy hoodrats,” in response to the highly
publicized riots in Baltimore, Maryland.13 On March 18, 2015,
George Washington University suspended and temporarily evicted
a Jewish student after he posted a “small souvenir swastika” on a
residence hall bulletin board.14 That same month, two students were
expelled from the University of Oklahoma following the leak of a
now infamous video of the expelled students and their fraternity
brothers on a bus singing a disturbing song littered with racial slurs
and verses making reference to the lynching of African Americans.15
These incidents are merely a brief sampling of a long list of students
at American universities who have been penalized, quite seriously,
for speech and conduct that is typically characterized as free
11 Id.; accord Eugene Volokh, No, It’s Not Constitutional for the University
of Oklahoma to Expel Students for Racist Speech, WASH. POST: VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Mar. 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2015/03/10/no-a-public-university-may-not-expel-students-for-
racist-speech/ [hereinafter Volokh, University of Oklahoma Expulsion].
12 Deanna Boyd, TCU, Student at Odds Over Comments on Social Media,
STAR-TELEGRAM (July 30, 2015), http://www.star-
telegram.com/news/local/community/fort-worth/article29592781.html.
13 Id.
14 George Washington University: Jewish Student Suspended for Displaying
Souvenir Indian Swastika, FIRE, https://www.thefire.org/cases/george-
washington-university-jewish-student-suspended-for-displaying-souvenir-
indian-swastika/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2016) [hereinafter Jewish Student
Suspended].
15 Manny Fernandez & Richard Pérez-Peña, As Two Oklahoma Students Are
Expelled for Racist Chant, Sigma Alpha Epsilon Vows Wider Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/11/us/university-of-
oklahoma-sigma-alpha-epsilon-racist-fraternity-video.html?_r=0.
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speech.16 While it might strike some as expected and just for such
offensive speech and conduct to be punished in some capacity by an
academic institution, critics are deeming these punishments to be
violations of the affected students’ First Amendment rights.17
Among the questions and concerns raised by free speech
defenders and interested academics is: why exactly are students
being so rigorously disciplined for their speech both on and off
campus?18 One current and prevailing theory hinges on university
antiharassment policies and a general confusion and disconnect
between the Department of Education (“DOE”) and universities and
colleges regarding current antiharassment and antidiscrimination
law.19 Not only is there confusion regarding what specifically
16 See, e.g., Will Creeley, Journalism Student Suspended for Offending
Hockey Coaches, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 14, 2012, 11:06 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/will-creeley/suny-oswego-journalism-alex-
myer_b_2121906.html (discussing the suspension of a SUNYOswego journalism
student for “disruptive behavior” which followed the student’s email inquiry into
the college’s hockey coach); Katherine Timpf, Sorority in Big Trouble After Taco
Tuesday Event Deemed Racist, NAT’L REV. (Sept. 15, 2014),
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/387987/sorority-big-trouble-after-taco-
tuesday-event-deemed-racist-katherine-timpf (discussing California State
University Fullerton’s sanctions imposed on one of the university’s sororities
following the organization’s “Taco Tuesday event where attendees wore
‘culturally insensitive attire’ such as sombreros”); University of Tulsa: Student
Suspended for Husband’s Facebook Posts, FIRE,
https://www.thefire.org/cases/university-of-tulsa-student-suspended-for-husbands-
facebook-posts/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2016) (discussing the suspension of
University of Tulsa student George Barnett following Facebook posts written by
his husband criticizing another student and two University of Tulsa faculty
members).
17 See Volokh, University of Oklahoma Expulsion, supra note 11; see also
George Washington University: Jewish Student Suspended, supra note 14; see
generallyHate Speech onCampus, AM.C.L.UNION, https://www.aclu.org/other/hate-
speech-campus (last visited Jan. 12, 2017) (adopting the belief that “all campuses
should adhere to First Amendment principles because academic freedom is a
bedrock of education in a free society” and that the constitutional protections
afforded to inoffensive speech are similarly afforded to “speech that deeply
offends our morality or is hostile to our way of life”).
18 See Lukianoff & Haidt, supra note 5.
19 Will Creeley, A Year Later, Impact of Feds’ ‘Blueprint’Comes into Focus,
FIRE (Aug. 28, 2014), https://www.thefire.org/year-later-impact-feds-blueprint-
comes-focus/ [hereinafter Creeley, A Year Later]; Lukianoff & Haidt, supra note
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constitutes peer-on-peer harassment and discrimination in
university settings, which is largely due to a series of changes in the
DOE’s policies on harassment and discrimination in the context of
higher education over the past twenty years,20 there is also a
disconnect between the standards recently promulgated by the DOE
and those set forth by the Supreme Court.21 The lack of clarity
surrounding antiharassment policies can result either in colleges and
universities implementing policies that are too broad in their
definitions of harassment, or in universities punishing conduct that
is not necessarily prohibited by their own policies, but might not
conform to the policies supported by the DOE. Both of these
scenarios undoubtedly result in constitutionally protected speech
getting swept up with legitimate harassment and discrimination so
that universities can rest assured that they have not left themselves
subject to criticism or vulnerable to litigation.22
This Note will evaluate former and current antiharassment
policies on college and university campuses, as well as the body of
law that governs these policies. While some scholars find that
reverting back to the existing standard for peer-on-peer harassment
set forth by the Supreme Court in Davis Next Friend LaShonda D.
v. Monroe County Board of Education would be the optimal way to
5; Azhar Majeed, How Colleges Label Protected Speech as Harassment—And
Why the DOJ and ED Have Made Matters Worse, HUFFINGTON POST (June 12,
2013, 4:36 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/azhar-majeed/how-colleges-
label-protec_b_3430109.html [hereinafter Majeed, Colleges Label Protected
Speech as Harassment].
20 See Lukianoff & Haidt, supra note 5; Dear Colleague Letter, supra
note 4. See generally Letter from Anurima Bhargava, Chief, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, and Gary Jackson, Regional Director, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to Royce
Engstrom, President, U. of Mont., and Lucy France, U. Counsel, U. of Mont.,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (May 9, 2013),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2013/05/09/um-ltr-findings.pdf
[hereinafter Findings Letter] (discussing the confusion that results from overbroad
definitions of harassment and discrimination policy in a university setting).
21 See Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. Of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 651 (1999);
Findings Letter, supra note 20.
22 Creeley, A Year Later, supra note 19.
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settle the confusion,23 this Note argues that that standard is
insufficient alone, but could benefit from the incorporation of
existing First Amendment jurisprudence. This solution would
relieve universities of the fear of investigation and litigation, which
has led to the infringement of students’ rights to engage in free
speech, expression, debate, and the free exchange of ideas, while
still ensuring that those students who have indeed been subjected to
harassment or discrimination feel safe and are adequately protected
at their institutions.
Part I of this Note examines the First Amendment and some of
its fundamental principles, as well as how the First Amendment has
been applied by the Supreme Court within the context of free speech
in higher education. Part II includes a summary of the relevant laws,
regulations, and government bodies that guide antiharassment
policies at institutions of higher learning. This Part also discusses
the fluctuations in this area of the law, most notably those that were
set forth in a 2013 DOE investigation’s findings letter (“findings
letter”), which has been a significant factor in the confusion
plaguing university administrators. Part III explores university
reactions following the 2013 findings letter and illustrates how this
letter has affected the antiharassment policies of colleges and
universities, as well as the general atmosphere at these institutions
following the letter’s publication. Part IV identifies the weaknesses
of the Supreme Court’s Davis standard,24 an oft discussed solution
to the issues that universities and colleges are encountering, and
suggests an alternative solution which would incorporate well-
settled areas of First Amendment law, such as the law of true threats
and fighting words, into a standard like the Davis standard to
balance the protection of free speech with the protection against
23 Joseph Cohn, Schools Should Realize that Davis is the Solution, FIRE
(July 16, 2013), https://www.thefire.org/schools-should-realize-that-davis-is-the-
solution/; Lukianoff & Haidt, supra note 5.
24 TheDavis standard originates from the Supreme Court’s decision inDavis
v. Monroe County Board of Education, in which the Court supported the
following standard for claims of peer-on-peer sexual harassment: “[A] plaintiff
must establish sexual harassment of students that is so severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive, and that so undermines and detracts from the victims’
educational experience, that the victim-students are effectively denied equal
access to an institution’s resources and opportunities.” Davis, 526 U.S. at 651.
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legitimate harassment and discrimination. This Note closes with
Part V, which briefly suggests more efficient and clearer ways to
notify universities of changes in DOE policy, and concludes with
final considerations of free speech on college campuses, including
its benefits.
I. THE FIRSTAMENDMENT ANDHIGHER EDUCATION
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads, in relevant
part: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press.”25 This text, known as the Free Speech
Clause, has been debated, discussed, and analyzed by judges and
justices since at least the early part of the twentieth century.26 Since
then, the Supreme Court has often attempted to distinguish what
kind of speech is protected by the First Amendment. The Court has
deliberated the Free Speech Clause in the context of pornography
and obscenity,27 speech involving imminent danger,28 symbolic
25 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
26 See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (analyzing
whether amendments to the Espionage Act and the application of those
amendments, which made it a crime to incite resistance to the war against
Germany and urge curtailment of the production of essential war material,
violated the Free Speech Clause); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919)
(discussing whether Debs’ conviction under the Espionage Act of 1917 violated
his First Amendment rights to freedom of speech); Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47 (1919) (discussing whether Schenck’s charge of conspiracy to violate the
Espionage Act of 1917 by attempting to cause insubordination in the military and
to obstruct military recruitment by mailing circulars to draftees violated the Free
Speech Clause).
27 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002)
(determining whether the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 abridged
freedom of speech under the First Amendment); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973) (discussing whether the sale or distribution of obscene materials by mail
is protected by the Free Speech Clause).
28 See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982)
(considering whether demonstrators in a boycott can be held liable for damages
caused to a business as a result of the boycott without abridging their rights to
freely associate); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (determining that Hess’s
conviction for disorderly conduct was an abridgement of his First Amendment
rights).
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speech,29 and speech in the workplace.30 The Supreme Court has
also discussed free speech specifically within the context of schools
and institutions of higher education.31 In Tinker v. Des Moines
School District, one of the earliest cases to tackle the issue of free
speech and expression in an educational setting,32 Justice Fortas
famously proclaimed that “[i]t can hardly be argued that either
students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”33 While Tinker
explicitly dealt with high school students and their protest of the
Vietnam War,34 the case generally stands for the proposition that
students at public schools maintain the constitutional rights to free
speech provided by the First Amendment, even when they speak
within the confines of their educational institution.35
Shortly after Tinker, the Supreme Court decided two cases that,
unlike Tinker, arose within the context of higher education.36 In
Healy v. James, the petitioners, who were students at Central
Connecticut State College seeking to form a campus chapter of
Students for a Democratic Society, were denied “official
29 See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (discussing
whether a federal law that made the destruction or mutilation of drafts cards a
crime was in violation of the First Amendment).
30 See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (holding that speech
by a public official or employee is only protected if the speech is engaged in as a
private citizen).
31 See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (holding that a school’s
refusal to recognize a student organization violated the First Amendment); Tinker
v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding that students
do not automatically surrender their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech
when they step onto school property).
32 See Tinker, 393 U.S. 503. Despite a school’s policy banning a display of
black armbands in protest of the Vietnam War, several students wore black
armbands and were suspended from school. Id. at 504.
33 Id. at 506.
34 Id. at 504.
35 See id at 506.
36 See generally Papish v. Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667
(1973) (holding that the proliferation of ideas on a state university campus,
regardless of the offensiveness of such ideas, cannot be prohibited merely due to
the general “conventions of decency”); Healy, 408 U.S. 169 (holding that Central
Connecticut State College’s refusal to recognize the Students for a Democratic
Society as an official student organization was unconstitutional).
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recognition” as a student group by the college.37 The Court noted
that, “state colleges and universities are not enclaves immune from
the sweep of the First Amendment”38 and reiterated the contention
that “the vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere
more vital than in the community of American schools.”39 The Court
further articulated the oft-quoted “marketplace of ideas” theory,40
coined by Justice Holmes, that “the best test of truth is the power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.”41
The Court stated that the “college classroom” is one place in
particular where the marketplace of ideas is so significant.42
One year later, the Court again ruled on an issue of free speech
relating specifically to colleges and universities in Papish v. Board
of Curators of University of Missouri.43 In Papish, the Court
examined the expulsion of a journalism student at the University of
Missouri who distributed a campus newspaper, which “reproduced
a political cartoon . . . depicting policemen raping the Statue of
Liberty and the Goddess of Justice.”44 The Court, relying on the
Healy standard,45 insisted that Healy undoubtedly represented the
notion that the “mere dissemination of ideas—no matter how
offensive to good taste—on a state university campus may not be
shut off in the name alone of ‘conventions of decency.’”46 Through
these cases, the Court made it clear that although the student speech
in question might be deemed blatantly offensive, the door is not
necessarily opened to unchecked punishment imposed by public
37 Healy, 408 U.S. at 170, 172–74.
38 Id. at 180.
39 Id. (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960)).
40 Id.
41 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting); see also W. Robert Gray, Public and Private Speech: Toward a
Practice of Pluralistic Convergence in Free-Speech Values, 1 TEX.WESLEYANL.
REV. 1, 8 (1994) (discussing Justice Holmes’ famous dissent in Abrams and the
emerging theory of the “marketplace of ideas”).
42 Healy, 408 U.S. at 180.
43 See Papish v. Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667 (1993).
44 Id. at 667.
45 See Healy, 408 U.S. 169.
46 Papish, 410 U.S. at 670.
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universities and colleges.47 Further, these cases affirmed the notion
that students, just like average American citizens, are entitled to
First Amendment protections, regardless of whether their speech
occurs on campus.48
A discussion of First Amendment jurisprudence within the
context of education would be incomplete without noting the
significant decisions of Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser and
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier. Despite the Supreme
Court’s insistence that students maintain the right to free speech on
school property,49 the Court first limited this proposition in Bethel
School District.50 The Court upheld the suspension of a high school
student following the student’s sexually suggestive speech at a
school assembly.51 The Court found that, while students certainly
possess First Amendment rights, the state has a significant interest
in “teaching students . . . socially appropriate behavior.”52 Thus, the
Court held that the First Amendment does not prohibit schools from
barring “vulgar speech and lewd conduct [that] is wholly inconsistent
with the ‘fundamental values’ of public school education.”53
Two years later, the Court was again confronted by the issue of
a public school’s restrictions on student speech in Hazelwood.54 In
this case, a school principal removed articles from the student-run
school newspaper that dealt with potentially provocative topics such
as teenage pregnancy and divorce.55 Again, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that students possess constitutional rights to free
speech; however, the Court held “that educators do not offend the
First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and
content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities
so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate
47 See Healy, 408 U.S. 169; Papish, 410 U.S. 667.
48 See Healy, 408 U.S. at 180 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)); Papish, 410 U.S. at 671.
49 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
50 See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
51 Id. at 685–86.
52 Id. at 681.
53 Id. at 685–86.
54 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
55 Id. at 262–64.
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pedagogical concerns.”56 Hazelwood has endured as an essential
case in evaluating First Amendment concerns within the context of
primary and secondary education; however, the Court inHazelwood
explicitly declined to determine whether the standards set forth in
that case would extend to similar concerns on college and university
campuses.57 Legal scholars have agreed that the Supreme Court
would not extend the standards set forth in Hazelwood to cases in
which the speakers are college students.58 Thus, we are left with the
Court’s decisions in Healy and Papish to guide our understanding
of students’ First Amendment protections within the context of
higher education.
II. ANTIHARASSMENT AND POLICY INHIGHER EDUCATION: LAW,
REGULATIONS, ANDGOVERNINGBODIES
A. Title IX, Title VI, and Higher Education’s Governing
Bodies
Despite the Supreme Court’s insistence that student speech is
protected by the First Amendment, student speech and conduct may
56 Id. at 266, 273.
57 Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 273 n.7 (“We need not now decide
whether the same degree of deference [to school administrators] is appropriate
with respect to school-sponsored expressive activities at the college and university
level.”); see also Alan Brownstein, The Nonforum as a First Amendment
Category: Bringing Order Out of the Chaos of Free Speech Cases Involving
School - Sponsored Activities, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 739 (2009) (“[M]any
lower courts have interpreted the Hazelwood standard to require the serious
review of some restrictions limiting student speech in school-sponsored
activities.”); Laura K. Schulz, A “Disacknowledgement” of Post-Secondary
Student Free Speech – Brown v. Li and the Applicability of Hazelwood v.
Kuhlmeier to the Post-Secondary Setting, 47 ST. LOUIS L.J. 1185, 1199 (2003)
(“[I]n applying Hazelwood to the high school setting, many courts have
interpreted Hazelwood very expansively.”).
58 See J. Marc Abrams & S. Mark Goodman, End of an Era? The Decline of
Student Press Rights in the Wake of Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,
1988 DUKE L.J. 706, 728 (1988) (“Although many university administrators may
attempt to use Kuhlmeier as a green light for censorship in higher education, the
courts will likely use Kuhlmeier’s footnote 7 to limit the case’s impact to the high-
school level.”).
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not be protected if it is harassing or discriminatory in nature.59 The
legal bases for regulations and policies at institutions of higher
education that aim to deter peer-on-peer harassment and to punish
those who engage in this undesirable conduct are Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 197260 and Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,61 federal laws which apply to all public universities in
the United States.62
Title IX states, in pertinent part, that “[n]o person in the United
States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.”63 The applicable section of Title VI states that “[n]o
person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”64 The DOE is the
government body, which, among many other tasks, serves to ensure
that public colleges and universities, as well as those institutions that
receive federal funding, comply with the requirements of both Title
IX and Title VI.65
The DOE delegates this particular responsibility to the Office
for Civil Rights (“OCR”).66 The OCR has significant power and
59 Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)
(2006); Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000); see
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506; Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633
(1999) (holding that under Title IX, private damages action may lie against a
public school board in cases of student-on-student harassment under limited
circumstances).
60 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
61 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
62 See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
63 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
64 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
65 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2012); U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Office for Civil Rights,
Racial Incidents and Harassment Against Students at Educational Institutions;
Investigative Guidance (Mar. 10, 1994),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/race394.html [hereinafter DOE
Investigative Guidance].
66 See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Dep’t of
Educ., Office for Civil Rights, and the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights
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responsibility in ensuring compliance, including the power to
investigate complaints of noncompliance with Title IX, Title VI, and
other DOE regulations at public universities.67 Furthermore, the
OCR maintains the power to determine whether federal funding
should be withdrawn from a particular university due to this
noncompliance and the power to refer cases of noncompliance to the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) for litigation.68
The DOE and the OCR, in order to provide guidance to
educational institutions regarding federal harassment policy, publish
reports and letters as they see fit,69 often to clarify the standards and
procedures that will guide both agencies when investigating and
evaluating harassment claims under Title IX and Title VI.70 In 1994,
Division, (Apr. 29, 2014),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2014/04/28/ED_DOJ_MOU_TitleI
X-04-29-2014.pdf (stating that the “OCR, led by its Assistant Secretary for Civil
Rights, exercises all functions previously administered by or with respect to the
Office for Civil Rights at the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare” and
that “[t]his includes but is not limited to OCR authority to directly enforce Title
IX against recipients of federal financial assistance from the Department of
Education (ED) through complaint investigations and compliance review”) ; 34
C.F.R. § 106.31 (2000) (discussing the prohibition of discrimination on the basis
of sex in education programs or activities); 34 C.F.R. § 100.6 (2000) (discussing
requirements of compliance of nondiscrimination in accordance to Title VI).
67 Katie Jo Baumgardner, Resisting Rulemaking: Challenging the Montana
Settlement’s Title IX Sexual Harassment Blueprint, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1813, 1815 (2014); DOE Investigative Guidance, supra note 65; U.S. DEP’T OF
EDUC., TITLE IX AND SEX DISCRIMINATION, http://
www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/tix_dis.html (last modified Apr. 29, 2015).
68 Baumgardner, supra note 67, at 1815; see DOE Investigative Guidance,
supra note 65.
69 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., SEX DISCRIMINATION: POLICY
GUIDANCE,
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/frontpage/faq/rr/policyguidance/sex.html
(last visited Sept. 23, 2016) (“[M]aterials serve an important function: to notify
schools and other recipients of federal funds of their legal obligations and the
ways OCR enforces federal civil rights laws, helping them to comply with the
law.”) [hereinafter SEXDISCRIMINATION: POLICYGUIDANCE].
70 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEAR
COLLEAGUE LETTER: SEXUAL VIOLENCE (Apr. 4, 2011),
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf
(explaining, via letter from the OCR, schools’ responsibilities to take immediate
steps to end sexual harassment and violence and providing examples of ways
A BALANCING ACT FOR AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES 413
the DOE published one such report to “outline the procedures and
analysis” used by the OCR when investigating claims of racial
harassment under Title VI.71 This report outlined that creating a
racially hostile environment, conduct that is central to a Title VI
violation,72 will only be determined if the racial harassment is
“severe, pervasive, or persistent.”73 The DOE stated that, “as with
other forms of harassment,” the standard for evaluating racial
harassment is a reasonable person standard, but one that integrates
the age, experience, and race of a student to their perceptions under
similar circumstances.74
B. The Supreme Court’s Role and the Introduction of the
Davis Standard
In 1999, an important development in antiharassment and
antidiscrimination law occurred outside the confines of the
legislature and the DOE.75 The Supreme Court determined the
outcome of Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, where
Davis brought suit against the Board on behalf of her fifth grade
daughter LaShonda, asserting that the Board failed to prevent the
schools can prevent sexual harassment and violence); Dear Colleague Letter,
supra note 4 (asserting, via letter from the Assistant Secretary of the OCR, that
“OCR’s regulations are not intended to restrict the exercise of any expressive
activities protected under the U.S. Constitution” and that “the statutes that it
enforces are intended to protect students from invidious discrimination, not to
regulate the content of speech”); OFFICE FORCIVILRIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OFEDUC.,
REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY
SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES (Jan. 2001),
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.pdf [hereinafter REVISED
SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE] (issuing, by the OCR, a revised document to
provide guidance to schools on how to recognize and respond to sexual
harassment of students); DOE Investigative Guidance, supra note 65. These
reports and letters are not formal law; however, in light of the OCR’s ability to
withhold federal funding and the DOJ’s ability to conduct compliance reviews,
institutions of higher education often treat this guidance as formal law for
implementation purposes.
71 DOE Investigative Guidance, supra note 65.
72 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000).
73 DOE Investigative Guidance, supra note 65.
74 Id.
75 Davis. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 643 (1999).
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sexual harassment of LaShonda by another Monroe County
student.76 The Court, in holding that a public school could be liable
for harassment claims that went unanswered by the school’s
administration under certain circumstances,77 set forth a standard for
peer-on-peer sexual harassment:
[A] plaintiff must establish sexual harassment of
students that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively
offensive, and that so undermines and detracts from
the victims’ educational experience, that the victim-
students are effectively denied equal access to an
institution’s resources and opportunities.78
Stated differently: “a single comment or thoughtless remark by
a student does not equal harassment.”79 The Court further
emphasized that “harassment requires a pattern of objectively
offensive behavior.”80 This standard is noticeably quite high and
maintains a great deal of free speech protection. Within a couple of
years of the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis, the DOE published
a report on sexual harassment with the purpose of guiding public
schools on sexual harassment laws.81 The report specifically stated
that the DOE and OCR would adhere to the standard set forth by the
Davis Court.82
In 2003, the OCR further clarified its understanding of theDavis
standard in the form of a letter from the Assistant Secretary for Civil
Rights.83 In the letter, the Assistant Secretary wrote that in order for
speech to be disciplined, the speech at issue would have to exceed
“the mere expression of views, words, symbols, or thoughts that
some person finds offensive,” reaffirming the DOE’s previous
position that “speech must be ‘objectively offensive’ before it can
be deemed actionable sexual harassment.”84 This letter also
76 Id. at 633–34.
77 Id. at 633.
78 Id. at 651.
79 Lukianoff & Haidt, supra note 5 (citing Davis, 526 U.S. at 653).
80 Lukianoff & Haidt, supra note 5 (emphasis added) (citing Davis, 526 U.S.
at 650).
81 REVISED SEXUALHARASSMENTGUIDANCE, supra note 70.
82 Id.
83 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 4.
84 Id.; Lukianoff & Haidt, supra note 5.
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explicitly discussed these standards as they interacted with the First
Amendment, and stressed that the DOE and OCR’s policies “are not
intended to restrict the exercise of any expressive activities
protected under the U.S. Constitution.”85 The letter further
explained that “Title IX and Title VI are ‘intended to protect
students from invidious discrimination, not to regulate the content
of speech,’” meaning that “the offensiveness of a particular
expression, standing alone, is not a legally sufficient basis to
establish a hostile environment.”86 Until 2013, this 2003 letter
constituted the DOE’s most recent guidance regarding the standards
of sexual harassment in school settings.87
However, the DOE and DOJ’s 2013 findings letter following an
investigation at the University of Montana caused widespread
confusion regarding the appropriate standards for evaluating
harassment on university campuses. In 2011, the University of
Montana hired former Montana Supreme Court Justice Diane Barz
to investigate reports surrounding the alleged sexual assault of two
female students.88 During the investigation, the University was
notified of several other instances of “student-on-student sexual
assault” that had occurred during the 2010–2011 school year.89 Barz
submitted a final report in January 2012, which determined that the
University had a problem with sexual assault on campus that needed
to be addressed.90
In May 2012, the DOJ began an “investigation of the
University’s handling of sexual assault and harassment involving
85 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 4.
86 Azhar Majeed, The Misapplication of Peer Harassment Law on College
and University Campuses and the Loss of Student Speech Rights, 35 J.C. & U.L.
385, 426 (2009) (quoting Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 4).
87 See, e.g., Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 4 (demonstrating a 2003
statement from DOE regarding the standards of sexual harassment in school
settings); Sexual Harassment: It’s Not Academic, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (2008)
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/ocrshpam.html (demonstrating a
2008 statement from DOE on sexual harassment in schools); Findings Letter,
supra note 20 (demonstrating a 2013 statement fromDOE regarding the standards
of sexual harassment in school settings).
88 Findings Letter, supra note 20, at 2.
89 Id.
90 Id. (citing Justice Diane G. Barz, Investigation Report (Jan. 31, 2012),
http://www.umt.edu/president/docs/DBarzInvestigationReport.pdf).
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students under Title VI and a compliance review under Title IX.”91
The DOE and DOJ sent the University their findings in May 2013.92
Their thirty-one-page findings letter stated that “sexual harassment
[policy] should be more broadly defined as ‘any unwelcome conduct
of a sexual nature’ including ‘verbal conduct.’”93 Furthermore, the
letter found that the University “improperly suggests that the conduct
does not constitute sexual harassment unless it is objectively
offensive . . . [w]hether conduct is objectively offensive . . . is not the
standard to determine whether conduct was ‘unwelcome conduct of a
sexual nature’ and therefore constitutes ‘sexual harassment.’”94 The
letter explained that the “allegedly harassing expression need not
even be offensive to an ‘objectively reasonable person of the same
gender in the same situation.’”95 Conclusively, the findings letter
explicitly stated that “the agreement [would] serve as a blueprint for
colleges and universities throughout the country to protect students
from sexual harassment and assault.”96 The findings letter would
prove to be perplexing and concerning for administrators across the
country, due to its inconsistency with guidance that had been
formerly established by the DOE.97
Since its release, the findings letter has greatly concerned free
speech advocates,98 as it drastically altered several aspects of the
91 Id. at 3.
92 See id.
93 Federal Government Mandates Unconstitutional Speech Codes at
Colleges and Universities Nationwide, FIRE (May 10, 2013),
https://www.thefire.org/federal-government-mandates-unconstitutional-speech-
codes-at-colleges-and-universities-nationwide/ [hereinafter Unconstitutional
Speech Codes]; Findings Letter, supra note 20, at 8.
94 Findings Letter, supra note 20, at 9 (referencing the University of
Montana’s policies on sexual harassment).
95 Unconstitutional Speech Codes, supra note 93.
96 Findings Letter, supra note 20, at 1.
97 Compare Findings Letter, supra note 20, at 8 (stating that “sexual
harassment should be more broadly defined as ‘any
unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature’”), with Dear Colleague Letter, supra note
4 (asserting that harassment “must include something beyond the mere expression
of views, words, symbols or thoughts that some person finds offensive”).
98 See Unconstitutional Speech Codes, supra note 93; Majeed, Colleges
Label Protected Speech as Harassment, supra note 19.
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2003 letter.99 The 2013 findings letter not only broadened the
definition of sexual harassment to any “unwelcome conduct of a
sexual nature,” including verbal conduct, but also rejected the
objective Davis standard reiterated in the 2003 letter.100 These
contradictions sparked the mass confusion, plaguing college and
university administrators who are attempting to conform to and
comply with the DOE’s standards. The confusion has only
continued since the findings letter, as universities are unsure
whether the standards set forth in the findings letter are to be
construed as current federal law.101
Immediately following the release of the findings letter, the
DOE and DOJ suffered intense criticism from free speech advocates
like the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (“FIRE”)102,
among other commentators.103 However, the DOE and DOJ
continued to defend the findings letter as a blueprint for colleges and
universities.104 Yet, in a letter to FIRE’s President in November of
2013, OCR appears to have abandoned its stance that the 2013
findings letter would serve as a blueprint for other universities, as
the letter expressed that “the agreement in the Montana case
represents the resolution of that particular case, and not OCR or DOJ
99 See Findings Letter, supra note 20; Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 4.
100 See Findings Letter, supra note 20; Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 4.
101 See Creeley, A Year Later, supra note 19.
102 “FIRE was founded in 1999 by University of Pennsylvania professor
Alan Charles Kors and Boston civil liberties attorney Harvey Silverglate.”
Mission, FIRE, https://www.thefire.org/about-us/mission/ (last visited Sept. 23,
2016). The organization’s mission is “to defend and sustain individual rights at
America’s colleges and universities,” which “include[s] freedom of speech, legal
equality, due process, religious liberty, and sanctity of conscience—the essential
qualities of individual liberty and dignity.” Id.
103 Facing National Criticism, Feds Attempt to Defends Controversial
Campus Blueprint, FIRE (May 30, 2013), https://www.thefire.org/facing-
national-criticism-feds-attempt-to-defend-controversial-campus-blueprint/
[hereinafter Facing National Criticism]; Wendy Kaminer, No Sex Talk
Allowed, ATLANTIC (May 15, 2013),
http://www.theatlantic.com/sexes/archive/2013/05/no-sex-talk-allowed/275782/;
Unconstitutional Speech Codes, supra note 93.
104 Facing National Criticism, supra note 103.
418 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
policy.”105 In a press release, FIRE’s President, Greg Lukianoff,
asserted that “[c]olleges have been bewildered trying to reconcile
their obligations under the First Amendment with the requirements
of the ‘blueprint’ – essentially an impossible task. OCR and the DOJ
now need to directly inform our nation’s colleges and universities
that they need no longer face that dilemma.”106
Unfortunately, the OCR and the DOE have not issued any
guidance to clarify their position on which standard should govern
antiharassment and antidiscrimination policies on college campuses,
putting administrations in the difficult position of merely making
educated guesses as to which standards apply and attempting to
comply accordingly. In discussing similar issues, prominent First
Amendment scholar and law professor Eugene Volokh107 stated that
[a] law’s ‘uncertainmeaning’ requires people “to ‘steer
far wider of the unlawful zone’ than if the boundaries
of the forbidden areas were clearly marked.
Those . . . sensitive to the perils posed by . . . indefinite
language, avoid the risk . . . only by restricting their
conduct to that which is unquestionably safe.”108
Volokh’s comment is especially relevant to this problem, as the
“uncertain meaning” of the findings letter generally leaves two
options for colleges and universities. First, adhere to the standards
set forth by the Supreme Court in Davis109 and the DOE in their
2003 letter.110 This potentially opens them to investigations,
sanctions, and litigation initiated by the DOE, the OCR, or students
claiming to have been unprotected by a lower-than-legal standard of
105 Letter from Department of Education Office for Civil Rights Assistant
Secretary, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Nov. 14, 2013), https://www.thefire.org/letter-
from-department-of-education-office-for-civil-rights-assistant-secretary-
catherine-e-lhamon-to-fire/ [hereinafter Letter from DOE].
106 Creeley, A Year Later, supra note 19.
107 UCLA FACULTY PROFILES, EUGENE VOLOKH,
https://law.ucla.edu/faculty/faculty-profiles/eugene-volokh/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2016).
108 Volokh, Harassment Law, supra note 4, at 568–69 (citing Baggett v.
Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964)).
109 See supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text for discussion of standard
set forth in Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 651–52 (1999).
110 See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text for discussion of the First
Amendment: Dear Colleague Letter.
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harassment and discrimination. Second, adhere to the standards set
forth in the findings letter.111 This precaution will ensure that all
potential viable standards are being met, while inevitably
prohibiting and punishing speech and conduct that would otherwise
be permissible under a lower standard and which is permissible
under the Constitution. It seems that many colleges and universities,
crippled by the lack of clarity and fear of litigation, are opting for
the second of these two options, which is evident considering the
“new policies [which] are being rolled out at campuses nationwide
that contain the blueprint’s broad definition of sexual
harassment.”112
III. COLLEGES ANDUNIVERSITIES FOLLOWING THE FINDINGS
LETTER
A. University Reactions to the Findings Letter
In June 2013, a month after the release of the University of
Montana findings letter, the National Association of College and
University Attorneys (“NACUA”)113 published a note discussing
the potential impact of the findings letter on colleges and
universities.114 The authors of the note conceded that, while the
OCR’s letter and agreement with the University of Montana was
“not legally binding on other higher education institutions,” the
letter did articulate the OCR and DOE’s expectations with respect
to sexual harassment policies on college campuses.115 Accordingly,
the attorneys who coauthored this note suggested that higher
111 See supra notes 79–93 and accompanying text for discussion of the DOE
Findings Letter.
112 Creeley, A Year Later, supra note 19.
113 The purpose of the NACUA is “to enhance legal assistance to colleges
and universities by educating attorneys and administrators as to the nature of
campus legal issues.” About NACUA, NACUA, http://www.nacua.org/about-
nacua (last visited Sept. 23, 2016).
114 AMANDA ABSHIRE ET AL., THE IMPACT OF THE MAY 2013 MONTANA
“BLUEPRINT” ON THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT-RELATED OBLIGATIONS OF
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, 11 NACUA NOTES 12 (June 14, 2013),
https://ogc.byu.edu/NACUANotes/NACUANote-Montana.pdf.
115 Id.
420 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
institutions consider revising their policies so that they would be
consistent with the standards pronounced in the findings letter.116
Spurred by opinions like that of the NACUA and the language
set forth by the findings letter, universities across the country began
to revise existing antiharassment policies in favor of new policies
that employ the exceedingly broad language developed in the
findings letter.117 In July 2014, Harvard University President Drew
Faust announced a new sexual harassment and assault policy that
would be in effect by the commencement of the Fall 2014 semester
and would be adopted by each of Harvard’s thirteen schools.118
These new policy considerations, which have since been
implemented,119 were influenced, not only by OCR’s investigations
of Harvard and at least sixty other colleges,120 but also by the
116 Id.
117 Compare STUDENTDISCIPLINARYCHARTERAMENDMENT,U. PENN. (Feb. 1,
2015), http://www.upenn.edu/almanac/volumes/v61/n20/pdf/012715supplement.pdf
(creating its Office of the Sexual Violence Investigative Officer to handle
complaints in light of new OCR guidelines), with Sexual Harassment Guide, U.
PENN., http://www.upenn.edu/affirm-action/introsh.html (last visited Sept. 23,
2016) (defining sexual harassment, broadly, as involving “unwelcome sexual
advances, requests for sexual favors or verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
nature”). See, e.g., Letter from Russel Carey et al., Members of the Sexual Assault
Task Force of Brown University, to Christina Paxson, President of Brown University
(Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.brown.edu/web/documents/president/SATF-Interim-
Report-December-2014.pdf (stating that the Sexual Assault Task Force was created
in the context of “[e]merging and changing federal guidance” and “investigations
by the [OCR]”); Policy Prohibiting Sexual Harassment, GA. SOUTHERNU. (July 20,
2015), http://president.georgiasouthern.edu/diversity/policy-and-procedures/sexual-
harassment/ (revising the 2013 to 2014 policy’s narrow definition of sexual
harassment to define it broadly as “unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature,” as
suggested in the findings letter).
118 Matt Rocheleau,Harvard Overhauls Handling of Sexual Assault Reports,
BOSTON GLOBE (July 2, 2014),
http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/07/02/harvard-overhaul-way-handles-
sexual-assault-reports/f9vQgdGeHTeg3vByODQ7jO/story.html.
119 Sexual and Gender-Based Harassment Policy, HARV. U.,
http://titleix.harvard.edu/policy (last visited Sept. 23, 2016); see OVERVIEW OF
FAS POLICY ON SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED HARASSMENT, HARVARD UNIV.,
http://www.fas.harvard.edu/files/fas/files/appendix_a1_overview_of_fas_policy.
pdf?m=1422897368 (last visited Sept. 23, 2016) [hereinafter FAS POLICY].
120 See Rocheleau, supra note 118 (“The university is revamping its policies
as colleges face intense scrutiny on how they handle sexual assaults. Harvard’s
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findings letter, demonstrated by the letter’s recognizable language
adopted by the Harvard administration.121 Harvard stated that it
would “adopt a standard of ‘unwelcome conduct of a sexual
nature.’”122 Under this new policy, “conduct is unwelcome if a
person did not request or invite it and regarded the conduct as
undesirable or offensive.”123 This standard is undoubtedly inspired
by the findings letter. Despite the OCR’s apparent abandonment of
the findings letter as a blueprint for colleges and universities,124
Harvard appears to have felt that it was better to err on the side of
caution by essentially “adopting an overly broad definition of sexual
harassment [which] serves as a preventive measure against lawsuits,
negative media attention, and possibly even federal
investigation.”125 This broad definition of sexual harassment
remains the standard published on the Harvard University website
today.126
Furthermore, it is evident that the language from the findings
letter has influenced not only university sexual harassment policies,
but also harassment policies in general. For example, the University
of Missouri defines harassment as:
unwelcome verbal or physical conduct, on the basis of
actual or perceived membership in a protected class as
defined in the University’s anti-discrimination policies,
that creates a hostile environment by being sufficiently
severe or pervasive and objectively offensive that it
interferes with, limits or denies the ability of an
individual to participate in or benefit from educational
programs or activities or employment access, benefits
or opportunities.127
undergraduate college and its law school are among more than 60 colleges across
the country under investigation by the US Department of Education’s Office for
Civil Rights.”).
121 See FAS POLICY, supra note 119.
122 Rocheleau, supra note 118.
123 Id.
124 See Letter from DOE, supra note 105, at 2.
125 Creeley, A Year Later, supra note 19.
126 FAS POLICY, supra note 119.
127 Standard of Conduct, U. OFMO., http://mbook.missouri.edu/standard-of-
conduct/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2016).
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This definition uses the broad “unwelcome conduct” language
from the findings letter as the standard for all harassment, as
opposed to only sexual harassment as the findings letter did.128
Universities and colleges seem to be willing to forego crucial
protections for free speech if it keeps them out of courtrooms and
free from controversy and criticism.
B. The University Atmosphere Post-Findings Letter
Mere days after the 2013 findings letter was released, FIRE
President Greg Lukianoff countered with an apprehensive and
disturbed response in the Wall Street Journal.129 Lukianoff
expressed his fears that this “stunningly broad definition of sexual
harassment” would result in an interference with an individual’s
right to freedom of speech.130 To illustrate the potential scope of the
far-reaching definition of sexual harassment propagated by the DOE
and the OCR, Lukianoff offered some instances of behavior that
would, in theory, violate the findings letter standard.131 For example,
“any request for dates or any flirtation that is not welcomed by the
recipient of such a request or flirtation” could be deemed a violation
under this new standard of sexual harassment.132 Further, “a campus
performance of ‘The Vagina Monologues,’ a presentation on safe
sex practices, a debate about sexual morality, a discussion of gay
marriage, or a classroom lecture on Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita,” all
of which could be considered “unwelcome” conduct with the
potential to offend, could be punished by university administrators
on campuses who strictly adhered to the findings letter definition of
sexual harassment.133While these scenarios might appear to be mere
hyperboles, they effectively illustrate the problematic breadth of the
standard formulated by the DOE and the OCR in the findings letter.
128 Findings Letter, supra note 20, at 4; accord Standard of Conduct, supra
note 127.
129 Greg Lukianoff, Feds to Students: You Can’t Say That, WALL STREET
J. (May 16, 2013),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323582904578485041304763554.
130 Id.
131 Unconstitutional Speech Codes, supra note 93.
132 Id.
133 Id.
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This breadth gives university administrators vast discretion when it
comes to punishing students for their behavior and speech and
inevitably leads to punishment, or the unwarranted fear of
punishment, for speech and expression that is protected under the
First Amendment.
Racially offensive tweets have been punished with
suspension,134 a souvenir swastika posted on a school’s bulletin
board by a Jewish student was met with temporary eviction from
school housing,135 and a fraternity’s ugly performance of a racist
song was disciplined with expulsion.136 The words and expressions
surrounding these incidents are certainly offensive and repugnant;
however, despite the shock and hurt that those who are subjected to
these words and expressions might experience, and despite urges not
to tolerate such expression, the expression is frankly protected under
the First Amendment.137
The threats of punishment of protected speech do not end with
the above cases. In the wake of intense racial tension and student
protest at the University of Missouri in November 2015, the
Missouri University Police Department sent a campus-wide email
to warn against “hateful and hurtful speech.”138 The email
134 See Boyd, supra note 12.
135 Jewish Student Suspended, supra note 14.
136 Fernandez & Pérez-Peña, supra note 15.
137 See generally R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (discussing
that while cross burning is reprehensible, it is still protected under the First
Amendment). Below, this Note will discuss two important cases of First
Amendment jurisprudence, Virginia v. Black and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.
Both of these Supreme Court cases limit the protections of the First Amendment
when the speech in question falls into the categories of “true threats” or “fighting
words.” See generally Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (explaining that
cross burnings done with intent to intimidate can be prohibited); Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (discussing that punishing verbal acts
which could provoke fighting is permissible). While the speech and conduct of
the students described in the examples at the onset of this Note could arguably be
considered true threats or fighting words, that speech would likely not meet the
high standards of these First Amendment limitations.
138 David A. Graham, When Campus Hate-Speech Rules Go Further
Than the Law, ATLANTIC (Nov. 10, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/11/hate-speech-on-campus/415200/;
accord AP News Guide: The Essential Information Regarding the Issues at the
University of Missouri, U.S. NEWS (Nov. 13, 2015),
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encouraged individuals who witness incidents of hateful or harmful
speech to contact the police immediately.139 The author of the email
concluded by noting that while hateful and/or hurtful speech is not
a crime, “[the University of Missouri’s] Office of Student Conduct
can take disciplinary action.”140 “Harassment,” generally, is defined
in the University’s Standard of Conduct as, “unwelcome verbal or
physical conduct, on the basis of actual or perceived membership in
a protected class as defined in the University’s anti-discrimination
policies”—a definition that undoubtedly encompasses hurtful or
hateful speech.141
An overbroad harassment policy, like the one articulated by the
University of Missouri, threatens the free speech rights of students
of all races, backgrounds, and ethnicities. The overbreadth of such
policies will not necessarily help to eradicate sexual violence,
discrimination, or institutional racism from our nation’s campuses.
These policies might aid in silencing something as disturbing as a
song beset with atrocious racial slurs,142 which to many might seem
appropriate and acceptable, despite its receiving constitutional
protection. Yet, what if the “unwelcome” and subjectively offensive
expression was a demonstration by students of color on a college
campus meant to protest racial discrimination? Consider the “die-
in” demonstrations143 that occurred across college campuses in
America following the death of unarmed teenager Michael Brown
in Ferguson, Missouri after he was shot by a white police officer.144
http://www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/2015/11/13/ap-news-guide-a-look-the-
university-of-missouris-issues.
139 Graham, supra note 138.
140 Id. The Office of Student Conduct at the University of Missouri can in
fact take disciplinary action, according to the university’s “Standards of
Conduct.” Standard of Conduct, supra note 127.
141 Standard of Conduct, supra note 127.
142 See Fernandez & Pérez-Peña, supra note 15.
143 Tyler Kingkade, College Students Stage ‘Die-In’ Following Ferguson
Decision at Several Campuses, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 4, 2014),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/02/college-students-die-in-
ferguson_n_6257134.html.
144 What Happened in Ferguson?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/ferguson-missouri-town-
under-siege-after-police-shooting.html?_r=0; Kiera Blessing, Harvard Students
Stage ‘Die-In’ to Protest Ferguson, NYC Cases, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 10, 2014),
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These demonstrations often involved students, dressed in all black,
lying on the ground for a specified amount of time, representing the
body of Michael Brown after he was shot.145 One can imagine how,
under a broad harassment policy, such demonstrations could be
deemed expression and speech punishable by university
administrations. This certainly should not be the type of speech and
expression the federal government seeks to eliminate through the
DOE’s standards for antiharassment policies. Such a policy would
be contrary to the important free speech values fundamental in this
country.146
The challenge then, is to draft policies and legislation that
effectively protect students exposed to harassment, while also
protecting the free flow of ideas and expression that is highly desired
on college campuses. In discussing the incidents at the University of
Missouri, one journalist wrote, “Mizzou, like all universities, has a
legitimate interest in fostering a campus climate where students feel
safe and included. Yet Mizzou, like all universities, also has a
legitimate interest in encouraging an open and robust discourse.”147
Similar to many universities across the country, “[t]he university has
[not] yet found a good way to balance those interests.”148
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/12/10/harvard-medical-school-
students-stage-die-protest-ferguson-nyc-
cases/WeW5pefmWzbTTpgJwVk1KJ/story.html; Chris Bowling, UNL Students
Stage ‘Die-In’ In Protest to New York, Ferguson Deaths, DAILY NEBRASKAN
(Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.dailynebraskan.com/news/unl-students-stage-die-in-
in-protest-to-new-york/article_d0ea5f82-801a-11e4-b41a-63ffc7761c98.html;
Kingkade, supra note 143.
145 Kingkade, supra note 143.
146 See generally Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (stating that “the
precedents of this Court leave no room for the view that, because of the
acknowledged need for order, First Amendment protections should apply with
less force on college campuses than in the community at large”); Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (stating that “[i]t can hardly
be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate”).
147 Graham, supra note 138.
148 Id.
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IV. THEWEAKNESSES OF THEDAVIS STANDARD AND AN
ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION
A. The Davis Standard and its Weaknesses
Some of the greatest critics of the antiharassment standards that
resulted from the findings letter are the strongest proponents of the
Davis standard serving as the proper standard for peer-on-peer
harassment in the context of education.149 In Davis v. Monroe
Country Board of Education, the Supreme Court established a
standard for evaluating peer-on-peer sexual harassment claims150
and held that “a plaintiff must establish sexual harassment of
students that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive, and
that so undermines and detracts from the victims’ educational
experience, that the victim-students are effectively denied equal
access to an institution’s resources and opportunities.”151 This
standard was endorsed by the DOE in 2001152 and was again
endorsed, as well as clarified, by the DOE in 2003.153
Those who recommend that the Davis standard be reinstated as
the standard for sexual harassment in the context of education tend
to believe that the definition of harassment set forth inDavis “strikes
the right balance between prohibiting actual harassment and
protecting the robust exchange of ideas . . . that higher education is
uniquely suited to foster and sustain.”154 One supporter of the Davis
standard believes that a college that adopts the Davis standard
communicates to its students an important lesson that “[j]ust
because you don’t like some gender- or sex-related speech doesn’t
render it actionable as harassment.”155 The Davis standard is
certainly protective of free speech and expression and demands a lot
of plaintiffs seeking to bring forth a claim of sexual harassment.
However, it is questionable whether this standard does enough to
149 Cohn, supra note 23; Lukianoff & Haidt, supra note 5.
150 Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
151 Id. at 651.
152 See REVISED SEXUALHARASSMENTGUIDANCE, supra note 70.
153 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 4.
154 See Creeley, A Year Later, supra note 19.
155 Id.
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protect the victims of legitimate harassment at the hands of their
peers on college and university campuses.
The Davis standard appears to be lacking in two critical ways:
(1) the emphasis on pervasiveness detracts from legitimate harassment
that may have been severe, but not systemic, systematic, or long-
term; and (2) the term “objective” used to describe the standard does
not account for the inherently subjective nature of harassment. The
first deficiency in the Davis standard is its focus on pervasiveness.
This element of the standard is highly protective of free speech and
ensures that “a single comment or thoughtless remark by a student
does not equal harassment.”156 Under this standard, however, one or
two truly frightening sexually or racially charged incidents executed
by one individual or a group against a peer would not be considered
harassment.157 It is not unreasonable for students to demand
protection from such incidents and university administrators certainly
aspire to protect their students from any such trauma. Yet, the Davis
standard would not serve this purpose, as one or two incidents would
not amount to pervasive conduct. Second, simply declaring that the
Davis standard is an objective one does not adequately protect
students from harassment due to the inherent subjectivity of racially
and sexually charged comments and conduct. It is imperative that
the standard be defined as a reasonable person standard that
additionally integrates the age, experience, and race of a student to
their perceptions under similar circumstances, as articulated by the
DOE in explaining the standard for racial harassment in a 1994
guidance letter.158 While some scholars and other interested parties
are adamant that the Davis standard is the answer,159 it is evident
that the Davis standard alone is not at all sufficient.
B. The Solution: Davis “Plus”
At the heart of the issues raised in this Note is an attempt to
balance the legitimate interest of maintaining a free flow of ideas
and expression on college campuses with the second, and equally
156 Lukianoff & Haidt, supra note 5.
157 See Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 651 (1999).
158 DOE Investigative Guidance, supra note 65.
159 Cohn, supra note 23; Lukianoff & Haidt, supra note 5.
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important, legitimate interest of protecting students and maintaining
a safe atmosphere to learn and grow. The Davis standard has
provided a base for balancing these interests; however, it is a base
that seems to tip slightly in favor of free speech at the detriment of
protection for students. On the other hand, the standard pronounced
in the findings letter tipped much too far in the opposite way,
engulfing an immense amount of protected speech in its wake.160 In
seeking a standard that might better protect each of these significant
interests, it is worthwhile to consider other areas of free speech law,
outside of the context of institutions of higher education, in which
free expression and protection from harm also intersect.
The most relevant areas of First Amendment jurisprudence that
should be considered to solve this conundrum are the areas of true
threats and fighting words. These areas of the law focus on incidents
when speech and expression lose their First Amendment protection
because they threaten the safety of those subjected to the speech or
expression.161As defined by the Supreme Court in Virginia v. Black,
true threats “encompass those statements where the speaker means
to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act
of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of
individuals.”162 The Court asserted that “[t]he speaker need not
actually intend to carry out the threat” and stated that “a prohibition
on true threats protects individuals from the fear of violence and the
disruption that fear engenders, in addition to protecting people from
the possibility that the threatened violence will occur.”163
Fighting words, another category of unprotected speech, were
discussed by the Supreme Court in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire.164 The Court in Chaplinsky unanimously held that
160 Unconstitutional Speech Codes, supra note 93.
161 See generally Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (holding, in part,
that a state may ban cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate without
violating the First Amendment); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942) (explaining that fighting words, or words that tend to incite an immediate
breach of peace, are not subject to the protections of the First Amendment).
162 Virginia, 538 U.S. at 359.
163 Id. at 359–60 (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388
(1992)).
164 See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. 568. Mr. Chaplinksy called a city marshal a
“God-damned racketeer” and “a damned Fascist,” while standing out on public
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fighting words, “those which by their very utterance inflict injury or
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace,” are not protected
under the First Amendment.165 Decades after Chaplinsky, the Court
sought to clarify some of the applications of the fighting words
doctrine and held that “the reason why fighting words are
categorically excluded from the protection of the First Amendment
is not that their content communicates any particular idea, but that
their content embodies . . . [an] intolerable . . . mode of
expressing . . . [that] idea.”166
These doctrines emphasize that, although free speech exists as a
general concept in the United States under the Constitution, words
and expression cannot be used in a manner that is meant to
intimidate, physically harm, or incite a violent reaction by the
listener or onlooker.167 The principles behind true threats and
fighting words, while still the occasional subject of clarification and
question,168 have been accepted as law and are important to consider
when reevaluating university antiharassment policies. These
doctrines, if considered alongside the existingDavis standard, could
aid in creating antiharassment policies that account for both
pervasive harassment and isolated, but severe incidents that might
have been overlooked under theDavis standard alone. Incorporating
this body of law and its language into university antiharassment
policies would help to ensure that the policies are both consistent
with First Amendment law and maintain protection and safety for
potential victims of harassment.
streets, and was arrested and convicted under a state statute for violating a breach
of the peace. Id. at 569.
165 Id. at 572.
166 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 393 (emphasis in original).
167 See Virginia, 538 U.S. at 359; R.A.V., 505 U.S. 377; Chaplinsky, 315 U.S.
at 573.
168 See, e.g., Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (showing that
the dissenting judge disagreed with the true threats principal); Gooding v. Wilson,
405 U.S. 518, 529–30 (1972) (finding that a Georgia statute, which prohibited the
use of abusive language that tended to cause a breach of peace, was
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague).
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V. A CALL FORCLEARER IMPLEMENTATION OFDOE STANDARDS
AND FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Procedure for Implementing New Standards
Regardless of which standards for antiharassment policies the
DOE ultimately decides to support, it is crucial that the DOE and its
specialized divisions, like the OCR, adopt a more efficient and less
ambiguous way to implement their own policies than letters and
informal documents. As previously noted, the findings letter
expressed that it would serve as a “blueprint for colleges and
universities” in protecting students from sexual harassment.169
While the OCR eventually deemed the findings letter merely a
resolution between the department and a particular university, as
opposed to the OCR’s policy,170 it did so months after releasing the
document and never released further guidance to what the existing
policy was. Guided only by the advice of attorneys,171 colleges and
universities were left in the position of having to assess their existing
policies and make educated guesses as to whether the DOE and the
OCR would approve. This system is inappropriate and inefficient,
especially when it is done so frequently.172
The DOE and the OCR use letters titled “Dear Colleague”
Letters or Guidance Letters to clarify existing law and policy and to
help universities and colleges better understand the DOE
regulations.173 Because these documents are produced and released
for a myriad of reasons by several different departments,174 one can
understand why university administrators might be perplexed as to
whether these letters are to be considered mere suggestions or
legitimate law. Furthermore, as one professor anonymously
declared following a “Dear Colleague” letter released by the OCR
in 2011, input and involvement from colleges and universities is
169 Findings Letter, supra note 20, at 1.
170 Letter from DOE, supra note 105, at 2.
171 SeeABSHIRE ET AL., supra note 114, at 2.
172 See SEXDISCRIMINATION: POLICYGUIDANCE, supra note 69.
173 Id.
174 Id.
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missing from the formulations of these documents.175 This lack of
involvement results in the bewilderment of institutions and a general
lack of notice of changes in DOE policy. Policy changes that directly
alter existing DOE and OCR policy, or which contradict case law,
should be set forth in a formal document that is understood to signify
a change in law and policy by all parties involved. Attempting to
implement policy changes through settlement agreements, which is
arguably what occurred with the 2013 findings letter, is an
unacceptable method. If a settlement agreement or findings letter
does in fact reflect a shift in policy that the DOE and OCR intend to
follow, this change should be rearticulated in a formal document to
avoid the confusion that occurred following the findings letter. The
DOE must come forward and explain to universities and
administrations in a straightforward manner which documents
should be regarded as formal documents moving forward.
B. Final Considerations
Without speech codes or policies prohibiting offensive speech,
hateful speech may go unpunished on university and college
campuses due to the First Amendment’s free speech protections.176
While this might not appear desirable upon first consideration, this
should not be an objectionable prospect. Encouragement of free
expression both promotes a society with diverse points of view177
and aids in exposing bigotry.178 John Stuart Mill, a prominent
English philosopher who wrote extensively about social and
political theory as well as theories of liberty,179 ferociously
supported free expression as a means to a more knowledgeable
175 An Open Letter to OCR, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Oct. 28, 2011),
https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2011/10/28/essay-ocr-guidelines-sexual-
assault-hurt-colleges-and-students.
176 See Hate Speech on Campus, supra note 17.
177 Keith N. Hylton, Implications of Mill’s Theory of Liberty for the
Regulation of Hate Speech and Hate Crimes, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 35,
38 (1996).
178 Hate Speech on Campus, supra note 17.
179 John Stuart Mill, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL.,
http://www.iep.utm.edu/milljs/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2016).
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society.180 In Mill’s ideal society, competing truths and hypotheses
could be expressed freely with the inevitability that they would be
discussed by the masses.181 Mill believed that “[i]f government
restrain[ed] expression, we [would] hold on to inferior hypotheses
sets out of ignorance.”182 By allowing college and university
administrations to punish hateful or offensive speech, which is
tremendously challenging to define, we run the risk of punishing or
silencing speech that might otherwise be accepted by society or at
the very least expand awareness of diverse viewpoints.
In addition to promoting a society with diverse viewpoints,
acceptance of free speech also helps expose bigotry.183 One critic of
campus speech codes aimed at punishing bigoted speech aptly stated
that “[v]erbal purity is not social change.”184 Supporters of this
perspective assert that “[c]odes that punish bigoted speech treat only
the symptom” and that “[t]he problem itself is bigotry.”185 The best
alternative to speech codes is instead more speech, which can
“counter bad attitudes and possibly change them.”186 Punishing
offensive and hateful speech does not eliminate the types of thoughts
behind the speech, but rather ensures that this speech occurs behind
closed doors, where it cannot be criticized for its ignorance.
Universities and students are not powerless against offensive
and hateful speech. For instance, the American Civil Liberties
Union has suggested that “instead of opting for gestures that only
appear to cure the disease, universities have to do the hard work of
recruitment to increase faculty and student diversity; counseling to
raise awareness about bigotry and its history, and changing curricula
to institutionalize more inclusive approaches to all subject matter.”187
Additionally, universities have the power to communicate with
their students and faculty and to initiate conversations with their
school community about potential harmful or hurtful speech. The
following illustration of such communication, aside from it being
180 See Hylton, supra note 177, at 37.
181 Id. at 37–38.
182 Id. at 37.
183 Hate Speech on Campus, supra note 17.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id.
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the origin of controversy and intense racial debate at Yale University
since October 2015,188 displays the type of communication that
universities should be engaging in with their students. Prior to
October 31, 2015, the Intercultural Affairs Committee at Yale
University sent an email to its students regarding offensive
Halloween costumes.189 The email expressed concerns about
insensitive Halloween costumes donned in the past including
“feathered headdresses, turbans, wearing ‘war paint’ or modifying
skin tone or wearing blackface or redface.”190 The email expressly
stated that “Yale is a community that values free expression as well
as inclusivity”191 and noted that “while students, undergraduate and
graduate, definitely have a right to express themselves,” the
committee hoped that students would avoid wearing costumes that
“disrespect, alienate or ridicule segments of [the] population based
on race, nationality, religious belief or gender expression.”192 While
this email certainly made clear that such expressions would be
frowned upon on Halloween, nowhere did the email state that these
expressions would not be tolerated or would be punished by the
university.193
A faculty member and residence hall administrator responded to
this email, supporting the students’ rights to wear whatever they
desired on Halloween, offensive or not.194 The email questioned
whether there was still room for a young person to be a little
obnoxious or offensive on today’s college campuses195 and
expressed concern that college campuses were “becoming places of
188 See, e.g., Liam Stack, Yale’s Halloween Advice Stokes a Racially
Charged Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/09/nyregion/yale-culturally-insensitive-
halloween-costumes-free-speech.html?_r=0 (discussing a dispute between Yale
University’s faculty and it’s students in response to an email sent by the university’s
Intercultural Affairs Community regarding offensive Halloween costumes).
189 Email from Intercultural Affairs Committee to Yale Students, FIRE (Oct.
27, 2015), https://www.thefire.org/email-from-intercultural-affairs/ [hereinafter
Email to Yale Students].
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 See id.
194 Stack, supra note 188.
195 Id.
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censure and prohibition.”196 This email response ignited debates
across Yale’s campus and across the country.197 The debate pitted
free speech on college campuses198 against the concerns of
marginalized students who felt as though their concerns were taking
a back seat to the right to be offensive.199 The issues that this debate
at Yale exposed are profound and will not dissolve in the near future.
However, regardless of which side of the debate one falls, it is
evident that the Yale administration succeeded in at least one
respect, which was to communicate, as opposed to punish.200
Proactively informing students and peers about potential sources of
offense, maintaining open channels of communication and debate,
and ultimately allowing students to express themselves freely, is,
and will remain, one imperative approach for universities and
colleges when seeking a balance between protecting free speech and
protecting their students.
CONCLUSION
Promoting and maintaining an appropriate balance between
protecting free speech and expression and protecting student-body
safety has proven a difficult task for colleges and universities.
Difficulties in attaining said balance have only been exacerbated by
inconsistencies in DOE antiharassment policy and poor
communication between the DOE, its subordinate departments, and
college and university administrators. While some observers
support a reversion to former antiharassment policies and standards
like the Davis standard, many students are rightly petitioning for
higher and more protective standards for those affected by
harassment and discrimination.
It is acceptable for the DOE to support a standard with a
foundation in the Davis standard; however, it is essential that this
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 See, e.g., Ryan Wilson, Open Letter to Associate Master Christakis,
DOWNMAG. (Oct. 31, 2015), http://downatyale.com/post.php?id=430 (showing a
letter written by students to Associate Master Christakis discussing their concerns
and disappointment in how Yale was dismissive of their concerns and feelings).
200 Email to Yale Students, supra note 189.
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standard, which is highly protective of speech, be adjusted to
accommodate student safety. An adjusted standard would embrace
a reasonable person standard, but one that integrates the age,
experience, and race of a student to their perceptions under similar
circumstances,201 and would include influences from other
significant areas of First Amendment law, most notably true threats
and fighting words. These modifications would extend protections
against legitimate harassment claims, while still protecting the free
speech of students. In addition to incorporating these adjustments
into the standard for antiharassment and discrimination claims, the
DOE must come forward with a clear method for communicating
and implementing policy changes to avoid future confusion.
Ultimately, colleges and universities must understand that despite
some speech being offensive or hurtful, the First Amendment
provides significant protections for speech and expression that are
difficult to overcome. As Justice Holmes appositely proclaimed in
illustrating his perceptions of free speech, “it is the principle of free
thought – not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom
for the thought that we hate.”202
201 DOE Investigative Guidance, supra note 65.
202 United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654–55 (1929) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
